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INTRODUCTION

The first several drafts of this article had added to the tide ("United States Policies
Toward State Trading") the subtitle: "Mild Schizophrenia." Certainly the various

"policies" of the United States toward "state trading" almost defy logical arrangement. If they had been dreamed up by a single individual rather than a single
government, that individual would doubtless be classified as suffering from a split
personality.
The basic policies of the United States fall into three categories: political, economic, and judicial. There is an inseparable intertwining of these three elementsin fact, the political and economic are so closely related that they are dealt with
simultaneously in part one of this paper; the judicial policies, however, are dealt with
separately in part two.
Throughout, there is an underlying theme of "Do as I say, not as I do." For
example, the United States Government's official "line" has always strongly favored
free trade and strongly opposed state trade. Yet, the United States engages in statetrading activities whenever it is to its advantage to do so. But despite the example
which it sets, the United States often tries to discourage its friends and allies from
engaging in similar activities.
As another example, consider the question of sovereign immunity for statetrading entities. Foreign state-trading entities rarely receive immunity from jurisdiction in American courts. At the same time, however, the Justice Department has
no hesitancy in pleading sovereign immunity for United States state-trading entities
when they are sued abroad.
Before beginning an analysis of American policies toward state trading, it is necessary to devote a few words to the problem of what is encompassed in the term "state
trading." The term obviously has different meanings for different people. One apt
way to describe state trading, however, would be to say that in its pure form, it
would be found at the opposite end of a spectrum of international trade from what is
classically called free trade.
There is probably no such thing left in the world today as a pure free-trade
country-a country where the government exercises virtually no controls over ex-
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ternal trade. There was a time in the nineteenth century when the largest international trader of them all, Great Britain, approached pure free trade. But none
of the major traders of the globe today is anywhere near this end of the spectrum.
Conversely, there is a whole bloc of countries today where the external trade not
only is completely controlled by the government, but is also conducted by agencies
of the government. This is, of course, the Sino-Soviet bloc. These countries would
represent the other end of the spectrum from the now nonexistent free-trade countries.
Between these extremes lie all sorts of variants. During the nineteenth century,
the United States approached free trade, with tariffs being the only important governmental interference with private international trade. During the twentieth
century, however, owing in large part to two World Wars, the United States has
moved much nearer the other end of the spectrum. Thus, today we have (in addition
to higher tariffs) a host of methods of interference by the Government. There are
any number of restrictions, both economic and financial, upon exports and imports.
In addition, the United States Government has itself entered the commodity markets
in a large way. Although we are still a long way from the Soviet position, we are
equally far from the nineteenth-century concept of free trade.
That we, in fact, engage in considerable state trading, however, is probably not
as important as the fact that we do so in a highly defensive manner. Our attitudesand, indeed, our policies-toward state trading reflect a guilty feeling. We would do
well to try to rid ourselves of this approach.
The chances are very great that we shall engage in progressively more state
trading in the future. If it is to produce the best results for us, we must realize that
such trading is nothing new; that there is nothing inherently "bad" about it; that
state trading and free enterprise not only are compatible, but also can be comple-

mentary; and that state trading can fulfill certain national interests that cannot be
served by private trading.
How far we must progress toward realistic self-interest in our attitudes and
policies is revealed in the present inconsistent manner in which we approach state
trading--by ourselves and by others.
I
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC POLICIES

A. Policies of the United States toward State-Trading Activities of Its Own
I. What We Say

The titular head of the United States Government has officially said that this
country is not a state trader. In a speech before a joint session of the Canadian
Parliament, on July 9, 1958, President Eisenhower typified our Government's ap-
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proach to the subject of state trading, when he discussed the question of the im-

balance of trade between the two countries. The President said:'
The United States and Canada are not state traders. All the products of industry manufactured in the United States and sold to customers abroad are sold through the enterprise
of the private seller. These articles come to you here in Canada only because of the
desire of the individual Canadian consumer to buy a particular piece of merchandise.
The United States Government does not place goods in Canada as part of a state-directed
program.

Again, an official denial of state-trading activities was voiced by the President in
his correspondence of this past summer with Nikita Khrushchev, Chairman of the
Soviet Union's Council of Ministers. After saying that expanded trade between the

United States and the Soviet Union could be of mutual benefit, the President emphasized the free-trade status of the United States by stating:2
As you know, United States export and import trade is carried on by individual firms
and not under government auspices. There is no need, therefore, to formalize relations
between United States firms and Soviet trade organizations. Soviet trade organizations
are free right now, without any need for special action by the United States Government,
to develop a larger volume of trade with firms in this country.

In general, then, the official policy of the United States is to deny the existence
of state-trading activities by the Government. In searching hundreds of statements
and speeches by public officials, and most especially press releases made available by

the State Department on speeches delivered by its top-drawer personnel, any number
of appeals were found for "new confidence in the free enterprise system and confidence in the trading system that has made us the envy of the world."3
2. What We Do

Despite the glowing references of official spokesmen to "private enterprise,"
"noninterference with commerce .... free trade," and other such antipodes of state
trading, the political and economic policies of the United States are-most naturally
and rightfully-aimed at achieving the largest measure of security and well-being for
the American people. These policies are energetically conducted in the direction of

fostering a strong base for American industry and agriculture, and finding oudets for
'Address of the President to the Members of the Senate and the Commons, House of Commons.
Chambers, Parliament Buildings, Ottawa, Canada, July 9, 1958. Quoted from an official White House
Release of the same date.
a Letter from the President to Nikita Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, July 14, 1958, in reply to a letter from Mr. Khrushchev, dated Tune 2, 1958.
Quoted from an official White House Press Release of the same date.
'Address by C. Douglas Dillon, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, before the
National Machine Tools Builders' Association, Chicago, Ill., April 24, 1958. Dep't of State Press Release
No. 209, April 23, 1958, p. 8. It should be noted that the State Department is required to report certain
state-trading activities to GATT (under art. XVII), but the Department defines state trading very narrowly. Included in the report are certain programs of the Bureau of Mines, Atomic Energy Commission,
and General Services Administration; omitted are such huge activities as those carried out by the
Commodity Credit Corporation.
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this continuously expanding economy. In achieving and maintaining these policies,
the United States has probably become the largest state trader in the world, outside
the Sino-Soviet bloc.4
State trading, in the modern concept of the term, is not necessarily limited to
governmental participation within the framework of international commerce in direct
competition with private enterprise. Put more simply, because of their size, some
of the commercial projects undertaken by the United States Government would be
beyond the normal scope of private industry. This does not prevent the activity,
nonetheless, from being state trading. By the same token, the term is not distorted by referring to state trading by the Soviet Union and the fact that there
is no private international trade in that country's economy with which the Government could compete.
a. Agriculturalcommodities. By all odds, the largest and most active government
trade enterprise of the United States is the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC),
which is organized and operated within the general framework of the Department
of Agriculture, but which has prominent liaison with many other sections of the
executive branch. Among these are the General Services Administration (GSA),
International Cooperation Administration (ICA),5 Office of Civil and Defense
Mobilization (OCDM), United States Information Agency (USIA), and most of
the executive agencies.
The Commodity Credit Corporation, through its price-support program, acquires
stocks of various farm and dairy products. These stocks amounted to something
over $5,0ooooo,ooo on January 31, 1958.0 The CCC is continuously seeking useful
outlets for the disposition of its holdings. Some are sold in the United States; some
are sold on the export market-both for dollars and foreign currencies; some are
turned over to government agencies for emergency disasters, such as drought and
floods; some are used to feed the armed forces, and some are bartered for
foreign raw materials and manufactured products. Substantial quantities are donated to needy people in the United States and overseas.
From a profit-and-loss angle, the Commodity Credit Corporation, despite its
huge volume, which has averaged about $5,300,000,000 per year since 1953,1 could not
stay in business as a private concern. For the single year ending June 30, 1958, its
books showed a loss of over $i,ooooooooo. s
Although the Commodity Credit Corporation had, during the past, engaged in
' Attention is invited to COMMODITY CREDIT CoRP'oRATION,
FINANCIAL CONDITION AND OPERATIONS (1958).

U.S. DEP'T op AORICULTURE, REPoRiT or

'The International Cooperation Administration is a semiautonomous agency, but within the Department of State for organizational purposes.
6 Published statement by Commodity Stabilization Service, U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Washington,
D.C., April I, 1958.
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limited export activity, the passage of the Agricultural Trade Development and
Assistance Act of

1954

boosted it into the mainstream of international trade.

Tide one of this Act authorizes the President to carry out a program for the sale
of United States surplus agricultural commodities under agreements with friendly
nations or organizations of friendly nations. In essence, this provides for the sale of
agricultural surpluses by payment in foreign currencies. These currencies accrue to
the credit of the Commodity Credit Corporation, but at the same time, they are
available to the Government generally, to be used for a large variety of purposes, as
stipulated in the Act.
Tide two of this Act is of a humanitarian nature-which Senator Hubert
Humphrey, of the Senate Agricultural Committee, called "a clear and specific giveaway program."' 0 It has little to do with state trading, except in the political concept
of trading food for friendship.
Tide three is usually referred to as the barter provision of the Act, and generally
speaking, it enables the Commodity Credit Corporation to dispose of surpluses,
taking in exchange strategic materials which are needed by this country for stockpiling purposes. It is under this provision that the General Services Administration,
Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, and Department of Defense, among
other agencies of the Government, acquire materials for national and supplemental
stockpile inventories.'1
b. Government financing of trade. Another major facet of United States state

trading is the huge international banking business in which the United States Government engages and which underlies international trade. The direct or indirect
effect of the various banking activities upon international trade varies from program
to program. The Export-Import Bank was established to promote directly an increase in United States overseas trade, and despite the provision in the Export-Import
Bank Act of 1945 that prohibits it from competing with private investors, some quarters feel that, in actuality, it does offer considerable competition to private investment.' 2 Other programs (such as mutual security programs, ICA, Development
Loan Fund, etc.) have other ends in view than promotion of United States trade, but
they, too, constitute financing for a huge amount of such trade which would not take
place without them. 3
o68 STAT. 454, as amended (codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).
" Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry on Policies and Operations
Under Public Law 480 (83d Congress), 85 th Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1957).
" The Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization does not conduct procurement operations for strategic
materials itself. Purchases are made through the General Services Administration, and barter proposals
are handled by the Barter and Stockpiling Division, United States Department of Agriculture. OCDM
(Executive Office of the President) Press Release No. 644, Sept. 3, 1958.
" The charge that public lending has contributed to an unfavorable climate for foreign investment
has neither been proved nor disproved. There have been two advertised governmental attempts to evaluate
United States policy toward continuation of its international loan assistance-namely, the Randall Commission in 1954, and the Second Hoover Commission in 1955. Cf. 59 STAT. 527, x2 U.S.C. § 635b
(1952).

"' The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), and its sister organization,
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), are multilateral banking facilities established under the Bretton-
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Our ideological preoccupation with free enterprise has resulted in a lack of cohesion or direction in these various state-banking activities. Sometimes our preoccupation with economic ideology results in serious political deficits. Compare, for
example, the statements by a United States official and a Soviet official. Albert J.
Powers, a Commerce Department trade consultant, who headed a United States
delegation to the 1955 International Industrial Exposition in Bogota, Colombia, gave
the following reply to a Colombian reporter who asked if there was any hope of
getting money from Washington for development projects:14
It is the policy of my government not to intervene in the financing of activities which
should properly be promoted by private enterprise. It is up to your people to create
business and industrial opportunities which will attract investment capital from the United
States. Remember, too, that you must offer the possibility of greater profits than can be
obtained at home. This is a time of exceptional inducements in my country for domestic
financial ventures.
Consider now this statement delivered by the Soviet representative at the Afro-Asian
Peoples' Solidarity Conference at Cairo, in December, 1957:1"
We are ready to help you as brother helps brother, without any interest whatever, for
we know from our own experience how difficult it is to get rid of need. Tell us what you
need and we will help you and send, according to our economic capabilities, money needed
in the form of loans or aid.
This laissez faire attitude, which has been crystallized during the past five years
among some officials of the present administration, is in sharp contrast to the
policies formed by still other United States Government departments; and the result
is an opportunity for the Soviet Union to point up case after case of schizophrenia
in policy among United States agencies and departments responsible for state-trading
activities.
c. PX's. Another segment of government operations, which has been looked
upon with increasing disfavor by the American business community, as well as some
foreign governments, is in the nature of unappropriated funds organizations. The
most important of these are the multitudinous military "PX's" which are strung
around the globe.' 6
Basically, the purpose of the military exchange is to provide merchandise and
services at reasonable prices for the health, comfort, and convenience of military personnel, their dependents, and, in some cases, civilian employees of the armed forces.
Receipts in excess of expenditures derived from the operation of these exchanges are
Woods Agreement. Both have their permanent headquarters located in Washington, D.C. They are not
official United States departments, although this country is a prominent member nation in both the Bank
and the Fund, and holds sufficient shares to command a position of power in both organizations.
' Waldo, Why Latin America Distrusts Us, Harper's Magazine, Nov. z958, p. 86.
5 Quoted from Dep't of State Press Release No. 96, March 3, 1958, p. 2.
10 Reference is made to Memorandum prepared in response to a request by the Japanese Embassy in
Washington, on behalf of the Supreme Court of Japan, for information and data relating to unappropriated
fund activities in the United States. U.S. Dep't of Justice, April 4, 1958.
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required to be used to supplement appropriated funds provided by Congress. These
functions have been held to be instrumentalities of the United States Government
and immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States.17 Indeed, this
is not a small nor a simple operation of the government. During the year 1956,
some 365 exchanges were operated, and gross receipts of over $520,122,000 were
8
realized in the domestic system aloneY'
In most cases, the Government buys direct from the manufacturer at jobber prices
and sells below wholesale in its vast chain of outlets, ranging from department stores
to snack bars. Hundreds of associations and merchants' organizations have gathered
force to block and curtail this "competitive advantage" of government operation over
the private retailer-but this "giantism" of government sales continues to expand, with
ninety additional exchange outlets opening and some 40o employees being added in
fiscal year I956."9
Traditionally, armed forces exchanges are perhaps more appropriately classified
within the military segment of government and at most only on the fringe of state
trading. But in the past few years, millions of dollars have been spent in oversea
areas where our military operations are located to procure indigenous wares and
services. These transactions are made through United States official channels. The
program has been such a success that there is a desire to improve it even more-make
it better, more important, bigger, by such volume-building effects as offering credit
and charge accounts. This merchandising mushroom of the Government has been
such a giant that it is affecting our national economy and those of foreign countries
as well.
Naturally, no one goal provides a complete guide to governmental policy in economic matters. In an economy such as ours, where changes are rapid and farreaching, the accent of policy shifts according to the logic of events. As outlined
above, the Government has established itself in many business operations traditionally
reserved for the private sector. Such action has been necessary, but it does not alter
the fact that the Government has emerged as a major competitor of huge proportion.
Even though the United States officially prefers not to be classified as a state-trading
national entity, the logic of events prove it to be a state trader on a great many
occasions.
3. Explanation of this discrepancy between words and deeds
The President's remarks before the Canadian Parliament when he said the two
countries were not "state traders" were made with measured and purposely chosen
words. Thus, he said:"°
"Brodhead v. Boothwick, 174 F.2d

21 (9th Cir. 1949).
Hearings Before a Special House Subcommittee on Military Exchange Matters, 85th Cong., ist Sess.
3334 (1957).
'o Statement issued by National Retail Dry Goods Association, Washington, D.C., July 10, 1957.
'0 White House Press Release, supra note i.
(Emphasis added.)
50
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All the products of industry manufactured in the United States and sold to customers
abroad are sold through the enterprise of private sellers.
He significantly avoided any reference to products of agriculture which orginate in
the United States and which enter the world market. If the term "agriculture" had
been used in the President's speech, it would have hit an extremely tender nerve
with the Canadians, because both nations have homogeneous farm surpluses to be
disposed of in foreign markets.
When the President said that "the United States and Canada are not state
traders," he was rather speaking in relative terms. Neither country is a state trader
in the sense that the Soviet Union is. In neither country is the bulk of international
trade carried out by the government. However, in both cases, there are severe
governmental restrictions and controls over virtually all foreign trade. And, from
a volume standpoint, as has been noted above, the United States Government itself
is probably the world's largest state trader outside the Sino-Soviet bloc-i.e., the
United States Government buys and sells more than any other free-world government. Of course, this still represents only a small percentage of United States overseas trade.
There is an obvious reason for this discrepancy between words and deeds of the
United States Government-this seemingly apparent case of schizophrenia. The
United States rejects the tag of "state trader" primarily for ideological or philosophical
reasons. As the leading power in the noncommunist world, we feel that it is
necessary officially to assume a position as the unequalled bastion of free enterprise.
The Government disposes of its commodities by way of various channels, as discussed above in this article, but the Congress has always inserted a provision for
private enterprise to have a hand in the transactions. Actually, this does not detract
substantially from the state-trading aspect. For example, all agreements for the sale
or other means of disposal of government-owned agricultural commodities are
approved, rejected, or modified by an interagency staff of the executive branch 1 The
various private export firms that handle the shipping details are frequently only entrepreneurs for the Government. The goods are transferred to them by government
loan and often sold by approval of one government to another government. This
is not too unlike the twenty-odd trading agencies which operate as the specialized
concerns for importing and exporting Soviet commodities. In other words, the freeenterprise aspects are basically only window-dressing.
The defensive attitude of governmental officials is really unnecessary, however,
as state-trading activities frequently complement private enterprise rather than displace it, although it is difficult to determine the line at which government activity
ceases to supplement and complement private industry and begins to compete
with it.
1

" Full explanation of this operation is offered in Hearings, supra note so.
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B. Policies of the United States Toward Trading Activities by Its Own
Citizens with Foreign State-Trading Entities
i. No over-all policy of encouragementor discouragement

There is no abstract, over-all governmental policy of encouragement or discouragement of trade between private United States citizens and foreign state-trading
organizations. However, the very lack of encouragement is itself a dampener upon
such trade. This is well illustrated by the exchange of correspondence last summer
between Mr. Khrushchev and President Eisenhower. This now famous correspondence was initiated by the Soviets, and it was a classic example of "heads I win, tails
you lose" diplomacy.
The Soviet Union claims to want an expansion of trade with the United States,
and this may be a major point in the switch in Soviet strategy. The beginning of
this "new look" in the Soviet economic offensive dates from sometime around the
year 1953, and roughly corresponds with the appearance of new faces among the
leadership in the Kremlin, following the death of Joseph Stalin. The new Soviet
"administration," headed by Khrushchev, has emphasized trade and aid as a part of
their intensive diplomatic campaign. They have sought and found points of weakness in the free world and have concentrated heavily on these points with vigor
and determination.
The President reminded the Soviet Chairman that there is still much room for
expansion of trade under current regulations without undertaking any new procedures. Had his answer been one of a flat negative nature, it would have been a
propaganda victory for the Soviet Union. At the same time, his reply was an
attempt by the United States to minimize Soviet gains from the ploy. Although Mr.
Eisenhower rather deftly batted the ball back into the Soviet court, it was clear that
there is no real desire on the part of the United States Government to increase trade
with the Soviet bloc. And the high-sounding statements favoring more trade in
the Eisenhower reply induced very few, if any, American businessmen to seek new
Soviet customers.
Despite the political difficulties discouraging trade between the United States
and the large state traders of the world, who, coincidentally, are primarily SinoSoviet-bloc countries, there are a number of other difficulties standing in the way.
There are the obvious difficulties with such things as patents, copyrights, royalty
payments, and trademarks, which the Soviets do not necessarily recognize or
respect.
In the Soviet Union, there are some twenty-three or twenty-four trade organizadons which operate in specialized commodities and with which American businessmen may deal. China and other communist countries have similar organizations
for foreign trade. In addition, most countries permit the embassies of communist
countries to include trade delegations among their regular staff. This personnel is
transferred around from capital to capital and generally handles much of the mer-
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chandise channeling with the Soviet Union. One major exception to this rule is
the United States. At the time of the United States's recognition of the Soviet
Union in 1933, it was agreed that the Soviet trading agency established in New York
City in 1925 would continue as the official trading agency here. This firm, known
as Amtorg, is a corporation which is organized under the laws of New York and is
wholly-owned by the Soviet Union. It is with this corporation that most American
businessmen deal in their transactions with communist countries.
The Cold War
The "cold war" has resulted in a substantial check upon trade with the Sino-Soviet
bloc and has, accordingly, imposed severe restrictions on trade with most of the
world's state traders.
About ten years ago, the United States Government instituted controls over the
flow of strategic goods to the Soviet Union, the European satellites, and Communist China. Upon the outbreak of the Korean War in mid-x9 5o, an embargo was
immediately placed on exports to North Korea. The export control policy toward
Communist China increased in its restrictiveness, and a complete embargo was
ordered in December i95o, after the Chinese directly participated against United
Nations' forces in Korea. In the spring of i951, general export licenses to European
countries of the Sino-Soviet bloc were revoked, and the requirement of prior approval by license was extended to cover all goods shipped to the Sino-Soviet bloc.
Since 1954, this policy has been liberalized to cover only strategic goods with respect to East European nations; but the embargo against Communist China has
stood.
Imports from North Korea and Communist China have been under license con2.

trol since December

17,

i95o, by the Foreign Assets Control Regulations of the
The Trade Agreement Extension Act of 1951 withdrew

Treasury Department.
benefits of trade agreement concessions from the Soviet Union and its satellites, and
an embargo was imposed on the importation of certain items from the Soviet Union.22
There is a complete embargo on the importation of all goods from Communist China.
United States trade with Sino-Soviet-bloc countries amounts to a very small fraction
of our total foreign trade. For example, in 1957, exports to the Sino-Soviet bloc
were only four-tenths of one per cent of total United States nonmilitary exports, and
imports from this bloc represented five-tenths of one per cent of all United States
23
imports.
One of the most active battlegrounds of the cold war is emerging in the neutral
underdeveloped nations. The prime weapons will be trade and assistance. The
strategy of the new Soviet leadership, both internal and external, will center on an
22

WORLD TkADE INFOEmATION SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COmMERCE pt. 3, at x-8 (1958).

19 U.S.C.
§ 1362 (1952).
2

Cf. STAT. 73,

" The following countries are listed by the Department of Commerce as constituting the Sino-Soviet
bloc: the Soviet Union (including Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,
East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania, in addition to Communist China, Outer Mongolia, North
ki&~, Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, and Tibet.
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economic offensive. The trade drive will bring raw materials into the orbit, especially
into Czechoslovakia and East Germany, for manufacturing. And as a consequence
of the increasing industrialization of the Soviet Union itself, state trading with nonindustrialized areas will become easier.
Keeping this in mind, the United States must meet the challenge of this Soviet
economic drive, but this can only be done on a governmental basis. The private
sector could not finance the operation or take the risk. For example, the Soviet
Government is freely offering loans at 2 per cent, whereas United States private
business must have considerably more. Even the United States Government's asking
rate stands at 3 per cent. 4 The only answer may be more state trading on the
part of the United States in the field of finance.
3. Unreliabilityof state trading
There is one strong advantage in favor of the free-enterprise system which the
United States must continue to emphasize. That is, business with a state-trading
corporation is unreliable and unpredictable. Frequently, it is based on war-economy
reasons. State traders often upset markets by spot sales. These may be made without relation to the cold war. The Soviets have recently been in and out of the tin
and aluminum markets. In the case of tin, Soviet dumping kicked the bottom out of
free-world tin prices this past fall. The International Tin Council countered by
buying at a stabilizing price, but its funds ran out and the price plunged more
than ten per cent, causing heavy losses to tin-producing nations such as Bolivia,
Malaya, and areas of Africa. 5 Here, again, "Good ole Uncle Sam" rushed to the
rescue by buying for his stockpile. In the spring of 1958, dumping prices on highgrade Soviet aluminum caused a ten-cent-per-pound cut in price by Canada's Aluminium Limited, and United States concerns were forced to follow with price cuts in
order to compete on the world market. 6 The Soviets could easily have based their
activities on a combination of a need for dollars and a surplus of tin and aluminum;
political objectives could have been secondary. But this might have also been a
"show of strength."
All the blame for the unreliability and unpredictability of state trading cannot be
blamed on the Soviets, however. In the 1957 hearings held by the United States
Senate, United States exporters complained bitterly about the allegedly irrational
decisions handed down by various government agencies concerned with selling United
States surplus commodities.
The unreliability of trade with state-trading corporations would probably not
greatly bother some of our larger corporations, such as General Electric or Ford
Motors, but it would be of prime concern to a smaller company whose objectives
"Attention is invited to the statement and testimony of C. Douglas Dillon, Under Secretary of State
for Economic Affairs, in Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Foreign Trade Policy of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 85 th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (I958), also published as Dep't of State Press Release
No. 726, Dec. x, z958,
a See Time, Sept. 29, 1958, p. 87.
'

8
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(1958).
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would be dislocated by spot trading. In the past, the Soviets have not sought
permanent markets for their goods, and did not wish to rely on foreign sourcestheir apparent goal being self-sufficiency for the supply of most items. Most of their
trading has consisted of spot sales and purchases, and this has made for inherent
difficulties in international trade, the large bulk of which is based on permanent
commodity markets.
4. Psychologicalblocks
There are psychological impediments weighting on most American businessmen
which disinclines them to deal with communist state traders, even if the United
States Government had no objections. Regardless of formal government statements,
there is a general feeling in the American business community that the United States
Government frowns at any and all trade with the Sino-Soviet bloc. This is true
despite the lack of any specific act by the Government in discouraging trade in the
nonstrategic items, and despite such things as the Eisenhower-Khrushchev exchange
of letters. There are a number of reasons for this feeling in the business community.
The general political and emotional atmosphere and bias of the cold war is
a psychological impediment to the businessman. The men who make the policy
decisions for their firms are affected by the whole anticommunist feeling of the
country. One State Department official said, "If I were a United States businessman,
I would not deal with a Soviet state-trading corporation." He said further, "Businessmen are right in concluding that the United States Government does not, in fact,

want any expansion of trade with the U.S.S.R."
American businessmen are, in fact, most reluctant to deal with Sino-Soviet-bloc
trading corporations. They do not want to have to explain to a congressional committee why they sold something to the Soviets, whether or not they are required

to have an export license. They do not want to be barred from contracts with the
United States Government because of sales to the Soviet Union or its satellites. They
do not want to be subjected to unusual FBI checks. They want to be thought of as
"good Americans.""7
One might recall the troubles of Douglas Aircraft when it sold war planes to
the Japanese before Pearl Harbor. The corporation and Mr. Douglas personally
were subjected to great criticism, despite the fact that they asked, and received, the
permission of the United States Government to ship the planes.
Another central fact of importance to businessmen in dealing with state-trading
countries-and one which cannot be overemphasized-is that this bloc economy is
set apart as a closed system, feeding on paced industrialization and developed in
isolation from the world market. Prices and costs are not measured in the terms
of the free world. The usual concepts of trade lose their conventional meaning
2T Of course, these statements are made in broad terms, as there is a small group of American business
representatives in Moscow, the majority of whom were admitted following the Eisenhower-Khrushchev
letters.
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when applied to this type of economy. Very few businessmen can afford to gamble
in such a market.
Technically, then, American businessmen are free to carry on business with the
Soviet state-trading agencies, other than in strategic goods, without fear of direct
prohibition by the United States Government. This is not true of Communist China,
where there is a total United States embargo in effect, but this is a political question
rather than one of economics and will be discussed below. But the psychological
impediment-when added to the other difficulties-is too great to expect any
volume of trade between the United States and the Soviet bloc in the near future.
C. Policies of the United States toward State-Trading Activities of Third Countries
I. Do as I say
From a philosophical, ideological, propaganda standpoint, we are all for free
trade and against state trade, but this is basically, "Do as I say, and not as I do." For
there are times when the hard facts of necessity make themselves felt in high government circles.
One of these "fact" statements was made before a gathering of business leaders
by a State Department officer. In explaining the sale of American agricultural
surplus commodities abroad, he said :2s
Regardless of whether exports are commercial or handled under the economic aid or
Public Law 480, it is important that they be competitive in price. The Commodity Credit
Corporation has the authority, and uses it, to make exports of commodities acquired
through price export operations competitive in foreign markets. This authority must be
used wisely and with scrupulous care because it is a matter of a government decision on
prices, in competition with private business, or government in other countries. We define
this as a matter of making our exports competitive.
Some third countries are unfeeling enough to point out that we are selling
abroad at a lower price than we are at home and that we are subsidizing exports.
When other countries do this same thing in our market, we call it "dumping," and
our normal reaction is to apply additional duties. "Thus, there are many international problems connected with action by the Government to sell products competitively with other producers," explained the State Department official2 9
Looking back to March 30, 1954, when President Eisenhower issued his general
foreign economic policy based on the Randall Commission report, he admitted that
our farm products were not competitive and that production was out of balance with
demand. He then warned that the huge holdings of the United States in many
commodities was "such as to be capable of demoralizing world commodity markets
"8Address by Willis C.Armstrong, Deputy Director, Office of International Trade and Resources, United
States Department of State, Policies of the Department of Agriculture As Related to the Disposal of
American Agricultural Surplus Commodities, before the joint Annual Meeting of the Texas Federation of
Cooperatives, the Texas Cooperative Ginners' Association, and the Houston Bank for Cooperatives, Austin,
Texas, Feb. 7, 1956. Dep't of State Press Release No. 66, Feb. 7, 1956, p. 7. (Emphasis added.)
2 Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
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should a policy of reckless selling abroad be pursued . .. ," but, "the United States
cannot accept the responsibility of limiting its sales in world markets until other
countries have disposed of their production." He then promised that the United
States "will offer its products at competitive prices," and would not "impair the
traditional competitive position of friendly countries by disrupting world prices of
agricultural commodities."3
As one of the leading news periodicals has recently summed up, "Successful and
effective United States foreign policy is measured in our ability to deal with each
small problem before it becomes a major offensive and that the ultimate ideal policy
goal would be to wrap up the political, economic, military and moral meanings of
the United States into a grand plan."3" State trading, perhaps, has been a small
problem to the United States, but, with the Sino-Soviet economic offensive underway,
it is fast becoming a major problem for us. The policy which the United States has
followed has been far from standardized, and there is, indeed, a need to wrap this
subject into a comprehensive plan, because state trading is an all-inclusive operation
with political, economic, and military overtones and undercurrents.
2. The new Soviet offensive
In November 1957, Mr. Khrushchev, in a conversation with a well-known American publisher, made the following statement :32
We declare war upon you-excuse me for using such an expresssion-in the peaceful

field of trade. We declare a war we will win over the United States. The threat to the
United States is not the ICBM, but in the field of peaceful production. We are relentless
in this and it will prove the superiority of our system.
The United States and other free-world countries have been so preoccupied since
World War II with the Soviet military menace that they have only recently grasped
the growing threat presented by Soviet economic power. For example, the total
exports of the Sino-Soviet bloc to the free world in 1957 amounted to $3,Ioooooooo.
This is relatively small in comparison to export figures of the United States, the
United Kingdom, or West Germany; but the important thing is that it is an increase of seventy per cent in four years. There is no reason why this figure could
not double or triple in the next few years. Trade-meaning state trade, of courseis the new instrument for communist penetration. As a general proposition, then,
it can be concluded that the free-world economy and private traders must reckon
with the hard realities of the growing state-trading economy of the Soviets. The
urgency of these problems has increased because of the expansion of the Soviet
economy and the growing national power of the Soviet Union.
"0Major policy statement issued by the White House at the time the President signed Executive Order
of September 9, 1954, delegating responsibility for Public Law 480. (Emphasis added.)
" The Course of Cold War, Time, Jan. 5, 1959, p. 21.
asAddress by C. Douglas Dillon, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Mr.
Khrushshev's Trade Challenge-Will We Meet It?, before Economic Club, Detroit, Mich., Jan. 27, 1958.
Dep't of State Press Release No. 30, Jan. 24, 1958, pp. 1-2. (It is interesting to note that the official
Soviet version of this statement for the Soviet press eliminated references to the word "war.")
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Whereas it has been stated above that communist exports to the free world in
1957 amounted to $3,Ioooooooo, the combined value of trade both ways totaled
nearly $6,300,000,000 in that same period. This is a new postwar high, being an
increase of 144 per cent above the 1956 total-but only about three per cent of total
world trade.
One way in which East-West trade has been minimized-and hence international
state trade has been minimized-is through a United States-sponsored organization
known as COCOM.3 3 This fifteen-nation organization, the letters of which stand
for Cooperating Committee, was established after the outbreak of the Korean
War for the purpose of standardizing a list of strategic materials which were not to
be exported to the Sino-Soviet bloc. The organization did not have the result of
decreasing East-West trade a great deal, since such trade was at a low ebb in the
early 1950's. It did, however, have the effect of keeping this trade at a very low
level and of denying strategic goods to our communist enemies in the Korean conflic 0 4
After peace was established in Korea, there was much pressure on the part of
many members of COCOM to revise downward the list of embargoed materials.
Such revisions were made in 1954 and 1958 over American protests. However, as
the COCOM list is the lowest common denominator, these revisions have not caused
any great change in American restrictions on East-West trade. Furthermore, each of
the other COCOM nations is influenced by United States policy as expressed in the
Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, as amended, which denies foreign
aid to any nation which sends strategic materials into the communist bloc that
would aid them in their capacity as a military foe,3. Soviet tactics
Centralized economic planning and control, as well as the state-trading monopolies
that characterize the communist system, facilitate the manipulation of foreign trade.
Quick decisions can be made without legislative authorization. Pricing and product
selection can be made without regard for economic considerations. This gives the
impression that communist-bloc programs have great flexibility and are conducted
efficiently and expeditiously. By deliberate manipulation of markets, the Soviets
have offered overly favorable deals to countries facing marketing difficulties, such
as Burma with a rice surplus, and Egypt with a cotton surplus. And they are inclined to make things even more difficult for the international market when those
same items might be sold or dumped again at the option of the Soviet state-controlled
trading system.36
"' COCOM's membership: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, West Germany, France, Greece, Italy, Japan,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States.
" U.S. DEP'T OF STATE PuB. No. 6684, STATISTICAL RVIEW OF EAsT-WEST TiRADE, 1957, at 31-34
(z958).
" 65 STAT. 645, 22 U.S.C. § 1611 (1952).
"aU.S. DEP'T OF STATE POm. No. 6632, THE SINO-SovIwT ECONOMICOFFENSIVE IN THE LEss DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, at 20 (1958).
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Examples of communist trading with neutrals such as Egypt and Burma are one
thing, but the squeeze put on anticommunist nations is something else. Japan is
the best case of a power friendly to the United States being given strong competition
by the Sino-Soviet bloc, using economic means for political ends. The Chinese
Communists have increased their share of the Far East market by as much as eightyfour per cent in some commodities to force Japan to accept recognition of their
regime and to weaken Japan's ties with the United States. To enable the Chinese
Communists to undercut their lowest competitor by at least ten per cent and to
facilitate Communist *Chinese dumping activities, thousands of native Chinese
workers are being exploited-thus, these transactions are spoken of as "hunger exports." The primary weapons which the United States has available to counter this
trade offensive are its own program of bilateral trade agreements and its participation
in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which increase world
trade levels and help the affected areas to maintain their private-enterprise economies without resorting to retaliation by state-trading activities of their own.T
4. Warning to small countries
We also discourage (quietly and covertly) small, weak, and especially one-crop
countries from getting too deeply involved in trade with state traders, because such
trade can have both political and economic consequences of a disastrous nature, despite jts superficial attractiveness.
Finland's recent troubles are a good case in point. Since this past summer, the
Soviet Union has been conducting a relentless campaign of economic war against its
small Baltic neighbor. This pressure stems from a desire to force the appointment
of Finnish Communists to the coalition cabinet. The Finns built up a huge shipbuilding and railroad car industry to pay Soviet World War II reparations. And
with this debt paid, they are now dependent upon the Soviets to continue to buy
these products. The recent Soviet actions of freezing Finland's rubles in Moscow, of
refusing to honor purchase agreements, and of offering unwanted or unneeded commodities in exchange have caused great hardship in Finland and have forced the
Finns to seek new markets. Their economic survival depends on it. 8
Iceland, too, presents a good example of a small, one-commodity nation being
ensnared into Soviet economic dependence. Last year, Iceland's disagreement with
Great Britain over fishing rights reached the boiling point, and Britain cut off further
purchases of fish from Iceland. The Soviet state fish monopoly immediately contracted to purchase a large percentage of Iceland's fish. The result of this, of course,
has been improved Icelandic-Soviet relations and deteriorating Western connections
in that country. The United States reputedly urged the Icelanders to go slowly in
accepting the Soviet offer, but our State Department had to do so very quietly, because the United States had no intention of buying the fish.
See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE PUB. No. 6629, THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ONrTARIFFS AND TRADE (1958).
38See editorial, Squeeze on Finland, Washington Post & Times Herald, Dec. 3, 1958, p. A'14, col. .
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Again, Egypt's economy is dependent on exports of cotton. The Soviets have
been heavy buyers of this commodity since the Suez war in 1956. The United States
refused to sell Egypt surplus commodities because of that country's close ties with
the Soviet Union. This strategy of the United States is now being re-evaluated in
the light of the new Soviet moves, and on December 24, 1958, the United States
agreed to sell the United Arab Republic $25,ooo,ooo worth of wheat for Egyptian
pounds. This is the first of many Egyptian applications to be approved by this
country since the'Egyptian-Soviet approachment began 9
The United States has not only been revamping its policy toward these smaller
one-crop nations being wooed by the Soviet Union, it has also begun to show interest
in dealing with small nations within the Soviet orbit. Poland is the most prominent
example in this group. Early last year, the State Department announced that an
agreement had been reached with Poland for shipment of agricultural commodities,
other raw materials, and various types of machinery and equipment, with credit to
be advanced by the Export-Import Bank and payment to be accepted in Polish
zlotys 0
In addition to the examples discussed above, the Soviets have tried a barter tie-in
with the Sudan for cotton, paying them prices above the world market, and have
made offers for Uruguayan wool and Colombian coffee.' Many of these offers are
being accepted because of resentment at restrictive features of free-world commercial policies as exploited by communist propaganda and tactics.
D. The Future
The United States may be forced into more state trade in the future than in the
past. For example, there is the probability of increased commodity controls on a
world-wide basis. There are international "arrangements" with respect to a number
of agricultural and raw material commodities today. The United States participates
in both the International Wheat and Sugar Councils. It may be both necessary
and advantageous for the United States to join in the control of other commodities
in the future if world markets of these commodities become too unstable. Furthermore, the Soviet trade offensive--if it is to be successfully countered-may require
more state-trading activities by the United States and its allies.
There have been serious attempts on the part of noncommunist countries to
regroup their economic positions in order to establish a workable system whereby
free traders and state traders might proceed without the unbridged gulf which now
separates the two systems. The most prominent of these attempts was the proposed International Trade Organization (ITO), whose charter would have established a parallelism between the rules of conduct governing privately-conducted trade
0' See Evening Star (Washington), Dec. 24, 1958, p. A-8, col. 3.
4038 DEP'T STATE BULL. 349 (1958).
"1Statement by C. Douglas Dillon, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, before
the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, published in Dep't of State Press Release No. 96, March
3, 1958, pp. 8-9.
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and those governing state trade 2 The ITO was advocated in many major speeches
out of the State Department, but the program died when the United States was
unable to join because of adverse congressional reaction. There is considerable evidence that one of the most objectionable features of the ITO charter to Congress was
its state-trading provisions.
Yet, the United States not only participates in a huge volume of state trading, it
does some of this state trading on a government-to-government basis. An example
of this are the wheat deals of the early i95o's with the Union of South Africa. Dr.
Bok, Manager of the Union of South Africa's Wheat Control Board, has refused to
deal on any basis other than government-to-government-not even through the commercial shipping agents of the United States. A new agreement on the same basis
with South Africa is now under consideration by the United States Government.
When queried on this state-trading activity, a spokesman said, "We feel that with
our huge supplies, it is better to sell on a government-to-government basis than lose
the sale. After all, they can buy from Canada and Argentina on the same basis."
This would appear to be sound, both economically and politically. Furthermore,
it points up the necessity for the United States to rethink its political and economic
attitudes toward state trading in general.
At the moment, the United States does not engage in state trading to the same
degree as do the Sino-Soviet-bloc countries, where state monopolies control all trade.
However, the United States does engage in state trading when it is to its advantage;
and there are a number of reasons to expect that in the future, the percentage of state
trading in United States trade-not to speak of the rest of world trade-will increase
considerably. It will, therefore, be prudent to adopt attitudes and political and
economic policies which are not based on the current theme of "Do as I say, not
as I do."
II
JUDICIAL POLICIES

The inconsistency of our political and economic attitudes is also carried over into

the juridical field. The most important legal problem with respect to state trading
is immunity from jurisdiction for state-trading entities. Under our system of separation of powers, it might be logical to assume that the attitude of courts would be
relatively immune from the effect of the inconsistencies prevailing in the other
branches of government. This, however, is not so.
Under the classic or absolute theory of sovereign immunity, a foreign sovereign
cannot be sued in our courts regardless of the activity which gave rise to the suit.
This theory seems to have been generally accepted by all branches of our Government until early in this century. But with the continual growth of world trade,
and more specifically the growth of state trading, there has been a growing move"'See WiLLrAm ADAm BRowN, JR., THE UNITED STATES AND R.SroIATIoN oF WORLD TRADE

(1950).
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ment among the community of nations toward what is called the restrictive theory.
Under this latter theory, the foreign sovereign is not immune if the activity which
gave rise to the suit was a private or commercial activity, as contrasted with a
public or governmental activity.
Until very recently, the United States supported the classic or absolute theory. At
the same time, however, our courts adopted several exceptions to this theory. Furthermore, since World War II our executive and legislative branches have entered
into and consented to treaties waiving immunity in commercial cases. But in opposition to this "modern" trend, the Justice Department has continued its unrelenting
support of the absolute theory. The over-all result of these conflicting attitudes,
therefore, is to make our law in this area far from clear.
A closer analysis of these elements may help to clarify our present position
regarding the subject of sovereign immunity and also indicate where we are going
and how we may get there.
This confusion which we find in our law is not unique. Many nations of the
world seem to be suffering from much the same difficulty. Whenever a nation varies
from the absolute theory, it inevitably encounters a certain amount of confusion.
This is true even where the shift has been completely to the restrictive theory. The
basic difficulty lies in determining what acts are governmental in nature and what
acts are commercial in nature. Yet, these nations realize that expanding world trade,
with most governments taking an active part, requires some methods of enforcement
of contract and tort rights-enforcement which is ruled out under the classic rule.
To accomplish this and to maintain competitive equality for free-enterprise traders,
our State Department has negotiated several multilateral agreements and a series of
bilateral agreements which contain provisions waiving or limiting sovereign immunity.
A good example can be found in the Status of Forces Agreement, which provides
that tort cases against a foreign force stationed in the country as a part of NATO
defenses are to be assimilated to claims against the local sovereign." Therefore,
the local sovereign defends the suit and must pay twenty-five per cent of any judg4
ment. The foreign government involved pays the remaining seventy-five per cent.
Since 1949, the United States has entered into bilateral treaties with Italy, Ireland,
Japan, Germany, Israel, Greece, Iran, the Netherlands and Korea, 4 each of which
contains language similar to the following:
" North Atlantic Treaty on Status of Forces Agreement, June I9, 1951, art. VIII, para. 5, [1953] 4
U.S.T. & O.L.A. 1792, T.1.A.S. No. 2846 (effective Aug. 23, 1953).
" Mr. George Leonard, First Assistant, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, in an
address before the Convention of the American Society of International Law, Washington, D.C., April 25,
1958, indicated that the implementation of this provision of the Agreement has not been quite clear and
that many technical points of interpretation remain unsolved.
"'Treaty With Italy on Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, Feb. 2, 1948, 63 Stat. 2255, art.
XXIV, para. 6, T.I.A.S. No. z965 (effective July 26, 1949); With Ireland, Jan. 21, 1950, art. XV, para.
3, [195o] 1 U.S.T. & O.IA. 785, T.I.A.S. No. 2155 (effective Sept. X4, x950); With Japan, April 2,
1953, art. XVIII, para. 2, [1953] 4 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 2o63, T.I.A.S. No. 2863 (effective Oct. 30, 1953);
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No enterprise of either Party, including corporations, associations, and government
agencies and instrumentalities, which is publicly owned or controlled shall, if it engages in
commercial, industrial, shipping or other business activities within the territories of the
other Party, claim or enjoy, either for itself or for its property, immunity therein from

taxation, suit, execution of judgment or other liability to which privately owned and
controlled enterprises are subject therein.

The State Department has madesimilar agreements with Denmark, Colombia,
Nicaragua, Haiti, and Uruguay. 46 It appears that future commercial treaties will
contain similar provisions.

The existence of these provisions in multilateral and bilateral treaties negotiated
by the State Department and approved by the Senate show in black and white a
definite policy trend away from the absolute theory philosophy. The State Department and Senate have recognized the moral responsibility of our Government to
respond to suits which arise from activities which are not traditionally governmental.
Such provisions also indicate a desire to protect American businessmen who must

deal more and more with foreign governments in the process of foreign trade.
A. The Case of State v. Justice
On the basis of these treaties which have been negotiated by the State Department, one would assume that our executive branch had decided upon a clear-cut
policy toward sovereign immunity. Nevertheless, nothing could be further from
the actual situation. The State Department adheres to the restrictive theory-lock,
stock, and barrel-and, thus, the above treaty provisions. Conversely, the Justice
Department and many other government departments and agencies (particularly

the Defense Department) adhere to the absolute theory as staunchly as ever-in fact,
more staunchly than in the past. This difference follows reasonably from the varying
responsibilities of the departments. However, eventually this difference must be
ironed out and a single policy adopted.
This schizophrenia within the executive family began as early as 1918, when the
State Department took the position that commercial merchant vessels owned and
operated by a foreign state should not be entitled to immunity.47 The Justice DeWith the Federal Republic of Germany, Oct. 29, 1954, art. XVIII, para. 2, [1956] 7 U.S.T. & O.I.A.
"r839, T.I.A.S. No. 3593 (effective July 14, x956); With Israel, Aug. 23, 1951, art. XVIII, para. 3, ['9541
5 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 55 o , T.I.A.S. No. 2948 (effective April 3, 1954); With Greece, Aug. 3, i95r, art. XIV,
para. 5, [1954] 5 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 1829, T.I.A.S. No. 3057 (effective Oct. 13, 1954); Treaty With Iran
on Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, Aug. 15, 1955, art. XI, para. 4, [19571 8 U.S.T. &
O.I.A. 899, T.I.A.S. No. 3853 (effective June 15, 1957); With the Netherlands, March 27, x956, art.
XVIII, para. 2, [1957] 8 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 2043, T.I.A.S. No. 3942 (effective Dec. 5, z957); With
Republic of Korea, Nov. 28, 1956, art. XVIII, para. 2, [X957] 8 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 2217, T.I.A.S. No. 3947
(effective Nov. 7, 1957).
"Treaty With Republic of Nicaragua on Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, art. XVIII, para. 2,
Jan. 2x, 1956, T.I.A.S. No. 4024 (effective May 24, Y958); With Denmark, art. XVIII, para. 3, S. Exec.
1, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (ig5i); With Colombia, art. XVIII, para. 2, S. Exec. M, 82d Cong., :st Sess.
(i95i); With Haiti, art. XVIII, para. 2, S. Exec. H, 84 th Cong., xst Sess. (1955); With Uruguay, art.
XVIII, para. 5, S. Exec. D, 8Ist Cong., 2d Sess. (1949).
47 2 GREEN H. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 529-30 (1940).
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partment opposed this position, and the battle lines were formed. The Secretary
of State exchanged letters with the Attorney General in an attempt to persuade him
to adopt the restrictive theory, but with the Supreme Court decision in the Pesaro
case,4" the State Department yielded to the Justice Department.
After this unpleasant brush with the Supreme Court, which must have been
embarrassing, the State Department adopted a policy of automatically suggesting immunity. Then, in 1945, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in the
Hoffman case.49 The opinion said that the Court would give great weight to the
view of the State Department toward the grant or denial of sovereign immunity in
a particular case, and "it is therefore not for the courts to ... allow an immunity on
new grounds which the government has not seen fit to recognize."5 Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion, said he agreed with the majority opinion if it meant
that immunity should not be granted unless another appropriate part of the Government "explicitly asserts that the proper conduct of these [foreign] relations calls for
judicial abstention."'"
The Supreme Court had now adopted what looked like an "after you Alphonse"
attitude. It seemed to be saying if the State Department does not agree to the immunity of a foreign government in a particular suit, then the Court should
not grant
immunity. This, in so many words, left the State Department carrying the ball
as to sovereign immunity. As a result, forces within the State Department once
again undertook a campaign to have the restrictive theory adopted by the whole
executive branch. This attempt failed, as had the attempt in 1918. However, these
forces were successful in obtaining a formal pronouncement by the State Department,
as formulator of United States foreign policy, that it would follow the restrictive

theory in the fulfillment of its responsibilities.
i. The Tate Letter

This pronouncement was contained in the famous Tate Letter, which was sent
by Mr. Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor, to the Acting Attorney General on May
19, 1952. After a discussion of the two theories, the letter stated:5
For these reasons it will hereinafter be the Department's policy to follow the restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity in the consideration of requests of foreign governments for
a grant of sovereign immunity.
It is realized that a shift in policy by the executive cannot control the courts but it is
felt that the courts are less likely to allow a plea of sovereign immunity where the executive
has declined to do so. There have been indications that at least some Justices of the
Supreme Court feel that in this matter courts should follow the branch of the government
charged with responsibility for the conduct of foreign relations.
The State Department, in taking this public stand in favor of the restrictive theory,
undoubtedly relied not only on the Hoffman case as judicial support, but also on
"' Berizzi Brothers Co. v. S. S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926).
"Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945).
51
" Id. at 35.
1d. at 42.
5"26

DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952).
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several other cases where the courts had whittled away at the absolute theory by
finding exceptions. The whole idea of sovereign immunity, even that of the United
States from suits by its own citizens, has fallen more and more into disfavor. The
view that governments should be answerable for their misdeeds has become prevalent. Although our courts have approached this issue with some caution, most of
the contemporary writers who discuss the subject of sovereign immunity advocate
cutting down the immunity of states in accordance with the restrictive theory.
Therefore, the State Department doctrine, as set out in the Tate Letter, has a great
deal of support. The Department has continued to hold to this position and has
done what it can to implement the restrictive theory. It is, of course, difficult to
document the Department's efforts, since it naturally does not wish to publicize its
refusals to suggest immunity when a request is made by a foreign sovereign. However, no case can be found where it has suggested immunity for a state-owned
"commercial enterprise" since 1952.
The Justice Department has never accepted the restrictive theory as laid down in
the Tate Letter. In fact, the Department never even replied to the letter. The
Justice Department has taken the position that the letter is merely an interdepartmental memo, a unilateral declaration by the State Department of its position, having
no binding effect on the other parts of the executive branch. Not only has the
Justice Department consistently opposed the restrictive theory, it has also continued
to support actively the classic or absolute theory. It has pleaded sovereign immunity
in almost every suit brought against the United States abroad where it thought the
plea would be accepted under the laws of the forum. Whenever asked by an
American court to comment on the question of immunity, the Justice Department
advocates the application of the absolute rule. The Justice Department is not required to consult with the State Department in such matters, even though a foreign
government is before the court which is seeking advice.
This conflict of views between the State Department and the Justice Department
bubbled along under the surface for years. However, on April 25, 1958, it was
brought out into the open in an address delivered by Mr. George S. Leonard, the
Justice Department official dealing with the matter.5 3
The basic reasons for this divergence of views is easily ascertained from the varying roles and responsibilities of the two departments. The State Department has
the primary function of conducting our foreign relations, and an important aspect
of its task is the development of international law. On the other hand, the Justice
Department is the United States' lawyer, and it is concerned with defending our
Government in law suits. Most other government agencies have only limited contact with the question of immunity, and that is normally when they are being sued
abroad. Therefore, they tend to support the Justice Department's position, because
it helps to keep them out of litigation. Conversely, most private American citizens
engaged in international trade back the State Department's position, because it gives
"3 Supra note 44.
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them greater protection in their dealings with foreign nations, which are more and

more involved in international marketing as buyers or sellers.
Have its cake-eat it too
By sticking to the absolute theory, the Justice Department hopes to have its cake
and eat it, too. International law provides that a sovereign may bring suit in the
courts of any other nation 4 Therefore, the Department of Justice has no trouble
pursuing the claims of the United States against the nationals of foreign governments. At the same time, under the absolute rule, the Justice Department can plead
immunity in all suits against the United States brought in foreign courts. From a
lawyer's viewpoint, this is perfect; his client can sue, but not be sued.
A number of nations have adopted the restrictive theory, and, as a result, the
Justice Department must defend certain suits against the United States in those
countries; the Department also must defend suits on the merits in those nations where
the United States has waived immunity by treaty. Such suits require a great deal
of time and energy, plus the possibility that they may be lost. Therefore, it is only
natural that the Justice Department should advocate the absolute theory, which requires only a single pleading and which results in a sure win. The Justice Department hopes to foster the retention of this situation. To succeed, it must steer the
United States back toward the absolute rule. Otherwise, more immunity will be
waived by treaty; and, if the United States courts adopt the restrictive theory, the
courts of other nations will be less prone to grant sovereign immunity when it is
pleaded by the Justice Department.
This problem has become increasingly serious to the Justice Department during
the past few years. Where, in the past, certain agencies and departments defended
themselves, the Justice Department now defends all cases against the United States.
More important, the United States has become extremely active overseas with the
establishment and continued operation of military bases; with the work of ICA,
CCC, USIA, and GSA; and with the development of many other fields of governmental operation. Because of this development, the United States, as of April 1958,
had fifty-eight suits pending against it in thirteen countries0'
In view of all these factors, it is not at all surprising that the Justice Department
continues to insist on the absolute theory as United States policy. It should be noted
that the Department, in supporting its position, utilizes all the standard arguments
favoring the absolute theory and, in addition, adduces the practical difficulties of
-applying the restrictive rule. These difficulties are at least twofold-first, the difficulty
in distinguishing between commercial acts and governmental acts; and second, the
unenforceability of judgments. As to this latter point, it must be kept in mind that
the restrictive theory only subjects the sovereign to the jurisdiction of the court to
render a judgment; it does not subject property of the sovereign, which is immune
2.

=' H. LAuTERPACHT, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 115a (7th ed. 1948).

= See address of Mr. George S. Leonard, supra note 44.
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to levy and execution. In this area, a particular problem arises if a judgment is obtained against the United States in a foreign court-i., usually there are no funds
to pay foreign judgments, and if they are to be paid, Congress must act first.
It is difficult to reconcile the foreign judicial policy advocated by the Justice
Department toward the immunity of the United States in foreign courts with our
domestic policy toward sovereign immunity. However, the policy advocated by the
State Department seems to fit well with our domestic policy, as evidenced by the
liability of the United States under such laws as the Court of Claims Act"0 and the
Tort Claims Act. T
Despite their conflict, the State Department and the Justice Department can and
do operate rather harmoniously, with each following its individual views in this
area. This is possible for a number of reasons.
i.There are relatively few cases involving sovereign immunity for state-owned
commercial enterprises. This is attributable primarily to the fact that most of our
international trade is with nations of the Western world that engage in a minimal amount of state trading. It is interesting to note that the waiver provisions
in the bilateral commercial treaties referred to above have never been relied upon
in a single reported case.
2. The absolute theory has a number of classic exceptions that make the two doctrines
less disparate in practice than they are in theory.
3. The State Department and the Justice Department operate at different levels and
in different ways, which helps to avoid direct conflict.' s
A standard United States policy toward sovereign immunity in the executive
branch can only be established by affirmative action on the part of the President.
SO3 6

STAT. 1136 (i9xi) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C).

1'6o STAT. 842 (1946), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-80

(1952).

in United States courts: When a suit is filed against a foreign sovereign, the State Department is
usually approached by the diplomatic representative of the sovereign if the sovereign intends to claim
immunity. The diplomatic representative will ask the State Department to suggest immunity to the
court. The State Department, following the restrictive theory, may or may not suggest immunity, depending on the nature of the activity involved. If the State Department refuses to suggest immunity, the
sovereign is still free to raise this defense in the court. The Justice Department may then become involved in the case if the judge asks the Attorney General for an opinion on the plea of sovereign immunity. From all indications, the Attorney General would adhere to the absolute theory and suggest
dismissal if there were no question of the status of the defendant as a sovereign, or if the case did not
fall within one of the classic exceptions.
In foreign courts: When a suit is filed against the United States in a foreign court, the federal
agency or department receiving notice of the suit would usually, and in any case should, inform the
Justice Department. The Justice Department would then inform the State Department and normally
request the State Department to consider making a plea of sovereign immunity through diplomatic channels. The State Department would then determine whether there should be a diplomatic request for
immunity, and it would probably reach its decision in accordance with the restrictive theory, regardless
of the theory followed in the foreign jurisdiction. If the State Department refuses to request immunity,
then the Department of Justice may plead immunity in the foreign court through the lawyers retained
by the Justice Department to represent the United States in the suit. However, before it makes this
plea, it would determine the probable success of the plea, which would depend, to a great extent, upon
the theory followed by the foreign court and the facts of the particular case. If the case is one of an
extriordinary nature, and if a plea of immunity might have serious consequences for our foreign relations,
the Justice Department would probably withhold the plea at the request of the State Department.
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As we have seen, there is complete disagreement between cabinet members. Eyen
though we have managed to get along with the two conflicting views, it would be
most helpful to our American merchants and to the conduct of foreign policy if.a
standard executive policy were established, so that the State Department and the
Justice Department could work together as a team in this area. The Justice Department, apparently, is dissatisfied with the language found in the waiver provisions
of the multilateral and bilateral treaties. If the restrictive theory were formally
adopted as White House policy, then it would be incumbent on the Justice Department to assist the State Department in drafting such provisions as could eliminate the
objections. It would, indeed, be a step forward if the President were to resolve this
issue.
B. The Attitude of the Judiciary in the United States
Some indication as to the attitude of the United States judiciary toward sovereign
immunity has already been revealed. At the present time, the Court gives great
weight to the views of the organ of the Government in charge of foreign relations
(State Department). As pointed out by the Supreme Court in the Schooner Exchange caser 9 a sovereign is entitled to immunity in the courts of another sovereign
only because of the consent of the latter. Such consent is given because of the
recognition of the equality of sovereigns and because of comity. Therefore, since the
basis of the immunity of foreign sovereigns is consent of the territorial sovereign, who
would be in a better position to determine consent in this area of foreign affairs than
that organ of government charged with the conduct of foreign relations?
The question of sovereign immunity has always been looked upon as a legal
question, but it is so entwined with political issues that it is very difficult, in the
final analysis, to separate it from international politics. In this respect, the individual
case should not be subject to political considerations. There must be certainty in
international law if international trade is to flourish. Yet, the general law or rule
should not be totally void of political considerations. Therefore, it is only proper
that our courts should give great weight to the position of the State Department.
The most recent expression of the Supreme Court in this area can be found in the
Republic of China case. 0 The Republic of China had brought suit against the
National City Bank of New York on a bank deposit. The Bank filed a counterclaim for an affirmative judgment on defaulted treasury notes of the Republic.
The Bank later reduced its counterclaim so that it did not exceed the original claim
of the Republic. The Republic claimed sovereign immunity to the counterclaim,
since it was not based on the same transaction as the original claim. The Court
found that if the Bank had brought an original suit on the defaulted treasury notes,
there would, without doubt, be immunity. This would be true even under the
restrictive theory, as there is no purer form of governmental activity than issuing
" The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, ii U.S. (7 Cranch) *116 (182).

0 National City Bank of New York v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (955).
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treasury notes. Therefore, the decision in this case does not go directly to the
question of which theory is to be followed in our courts. However, it is interesting
to note that both the Court's opinion and the dissenting opinion expressed a disposition toward following the State Department in such questions.
Justice Frankfurter, in the Court's opinion, said :61
A sovereign has freely come as a suitor into our courts; our State Department neither
has been asked nor has it given the slightest intimation that in its judgment allowance of
counterclaims in such a situation would embarrass friendly relations with the Republic of
China.
Thus, the Court insinuated that if the State Department had taken a position, the
result might have been different. Justice Reed, in the dissenting opinion, had this
62
to say:
International relations are pre-eminently a matter of public policy. Judicial views of
supposed public interests are not the touchstone whereby to determine the law. The
change from a generous to a parsimonious application of the principle of sovereign immunity should come from Congress or the Executive. Our courts possess great powers
and have solemn obligations. Our country allots power to the judiciary in the confidence
that, in view of the separation of powers, judicial authority will not undertake determinations which are the primary concern of other branches of our Government. Differences
of view exist as to the desirable scope of sovereign immunity and the necessity for nonjudicial determinations. But surely it is better that the decisions be left to those organs
of Government that have the responsibility for determining public policy in carrying out
foreign affairs. The establishment of political or economic policies is not for the courts.
Such action would be an abuse of judicial power. It is only by a conscious and determined
purpose to keep the functions of the various branches of government separate that the
courts can most effectively carry out their duties. I would leave this question of the
jurisdictional immunity of foreign sovereigns to the other branches.
The Court, by the following reasoning, held that the Republic had waived its
immunity :63
It is recognized that a counterclaim based on the subject matter of a sovereign's suit
is allowed to cut into the doctrine of immunity. This is proof positive that the doctrine is
not absolute, and that considerations of fair play must be taken into account in its application. But the limitation of "based on the subject matter" is too indeterminate, indeed too
capricious, to mark the bounds of the limitations on the doctrine of sovereign immunity .... No doubt the present counter claims cannot fairly be deemed to be related
to the Railway Agency's deposit of funds except insofar as the transactions between the
Republic of China and the petitioner may be regarded as aspects of a continuous business
relationship. The point is that the ultimate thrust of the consideration of fair dealing
which allows a setoff or counterclaim based on the same subject matter reaches the present
situation.
Therefore, the Court found a waiver of immunity when there was no suggestion
fi6m the State Department to the contrary, because of the "ultimate thrust of the
" Id. at 370-71.

oId. at 364.

rd. at 364-65.

(Emphasis added.)
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consideration of fair dealing." In view of the extent to which the majority went
in this case to find a waiver, the unfavorable attitude of the majority toward sovereign immunity is quite evident. Because our modern federal pleading allows any
claim to be filed as a cross-claim,6 the Court has been able to broaden the
doctrine of waiver of immunity so that, apparently, if a sovereign brings suit, the
defendant can raise any claim as a defense. As Justice Reed says in the minority
opinion: "It seems to me that the Court sanctions a circuitous evasion of the wellestablished rule prohibiting direct suits against foreign sovereigns." 65
The attitude of the minority, coupled with the holding of the Court, makes it
appear quite probable that if the Court is faced with deciding the issue between the
absolute and the restrictive theory, it will follow the State Department's lead and
adopt the restrictive theory in the United States. This is a reasonable conclusion
when one realizes that in certain respects, the case here goes even further than the
restrictive theory in cutting down the doctrine of sovereign immunity. For under
this case, if a foreign sovereign brings suit in the United States, the defendant
can purchase at par or discount any claim against that sovereign, even one of the
highest public character (such as was found in this case) and use it as a defense
to offset the sovereign's claim. This, in every sense, is equal to a right to sue the
sovereign in our courts and is, in many ways, more effective, in that there is no need
to collect the judgment, as it offsets a debt owed to the sovereign.
From a reading of all the cases in this area, from the Schooner Exchange case
down to the Republic of China case, it appears that much of the courts' difficulties in
this area stems from their failure on occasion to analyze thoroughly the mixture
of political and legal issues involved in the question of whether to grant immunity.
On certain related issues, the courts have long followed the practice of letting the
State Department make the determination. For example, on the question of the
right of a foreign sovereign to sue in our courts-that is, whether a certain government is sovereign-the determination is left to the State Department.68 Immunity,
however, is a more complex question. It contains both political and legal elements.
It falls across the separation between our executive and judicial branches, and it is
very difficult to deal with these elements independently. Accordingly, the rocky
course sovereign immunity has followed is understandable.
The present policy or attitude of the Supreme Court to look to the State Department to set our national policy on this question is probably the better judicial course,
because the question of sovereign immunity has a significant and direct bearing on
our foreign relations as well as on our foreign trade, which is an integral part of
our foreign relations.
4

" FED. R. Civ. P. 13.

c National City Bank of New York v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 372 (i955).
o Cf. Chase National Bank v. Director General of Postal Remittances and Savings Bank, 278 App. Div.
935, IO5 N.Y.S.2d 923 (ist Dep't ig5i); Republic of China v. Pong Tsu Mow, 2oi F.2d 195 (D.C. Cir.
1952); Japanese Government v. Commercial Casualty Insurance Co., IOI F. Supp. 243 (S.D. N.Y. 195).
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C. Our Policy Today and Tomorrow
Today, the policy of the United States toward sovereign immunity is unsettled.
The judicial branch is inclined to follow the lead of the executive branch. However,
this is difficult, because the executive branch is torn between the two different theories
of immunity. While a decision could be reached by the White House as to which
theory to follow, it is very doubtful that the present administration will take the
initiative. Although a number of advantages would obtain from a resolution of
the problem, there is no crying need for a solution at this time. We can continue
to drift, as we have been doing for some time, without any disastrous consequences.
Eventually, however, it seems probable that the restrictive theory will win out,
because the continued expansion of state trading in the world places an unfair burden on American businessmen if they cannot bring suit against state traders here in
the United States. As long as this unfair burden exists, more American businessmen
will shy away from transactions with foreign governments and will thus hamper the
expansion of foreign trade-which is a concomitant of international peace. Our
policies must progress to meet the challenge.
Congress could enact legislation adopting either theory of jurisdiction for United
States courts. However, research indicates that not a single bill has ever even been
introduced on this subject. The only indication of congressional policy or views in
this area has been the senate approval of treaties containing immunity waivers in
commercial cases.
The best solution would be for Congress and the executive branch to act together
in the adoption of the restrictive theory, because in this way, a procedure could be
established to give American businessmen their day in court in the determination of
whether the activity giving rise to the suit was commercial or governmental. If
the executive branch alone adopts the restrictive theory and the courts continue to
look to the executive branch to determine the question of immunity, then such determination would be made solely by the State Department, without a hearing in
which the American plaintiff could set forth his side of the case.
Despite the problems involved, and our confusing and halting course, we are,
in the writer's view, approaching a national policy of adherence to the restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity.
POSTLUDE

Although there is no urgency in working out a solution to the juridical problem
of sovereign immunity and state trading, the same cannot be said for our political
and economic attitudes with respect to such trading. The importance of rethinking
our attitudes was stressed in an address by Under Secretary C. Douglas Dillon delivered just after the recent departure from this country of Soviet Deputy Premier
Anastas Mikoyan. Mr. Dillon concluded :67
" Address before the Mississippi Valley Trade Council, New Orleans, La., Jan. 27, x959.
State Press Release No. 65, Jan. 27, 1959.
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When the Soviet Government engages in economic assistance, it uses the resources of its
entire economy, because there is complete identity between the economy and the government. We have no wish to emulate Soviet patterns of organization or behavior. However, during times of crisis in our past, private enterprise has formed an effective working
partnership with Government. We are now living in a time of continuing crisis. We
must find ways to forge a new working partnership to meet the challenge of our time.
Such a partnership must be based on a realistic understanding that there is nothing
incompatible between state trading and free enterprise.
Of course, we should-and will-continue to favor free-enterprise trading when
it is possible to do so. However, we must also use state-trading techniques and

instrumentalities when it is advantageous to do so. And, more important, we must
use them admittedly, with malice aforethought, and without apology, if they are
to be effective against the increasingly threatening Soviet economic offensive. Our
foreign economic policies must be based on self interest, not on sentiment and

nineteenth-century slogans.

